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The measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI QKD) was proposed to
make BB84 completely free from any side-channel in detectors. Like in prepare & measure QKD,
the use of other protocols in MDI setting would be advantageous in some practical situations. In
this paper, we consider SARG04 protocol in MDI setting. The prepare & measure SARG04 is
proven to be able to generate a key up to two-photon emission events. In MDI setting we show that
the key generation is possible from the event with single or two-photon emission by a party and
single-photon emission by the other party, but the two-photon emission event by both parties cannot
contribute to the key generation. On the contrary to prepare & measure SARG04 protocol where
the experimental setup is exactly the same as BB84, the measurement setup for SARG04 in MDI
setting cannot be the same as that for BB84 since the measurement setup for BB84 in MDI setting
induces too many bit errors. To overcome this problem, we propose two alternative experimental
setups, and we simulate the resulting key rate. Our study highlights the requirements that MDI
QKD poses on us regarding with the implementation of a variety of QKD protocols.
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) can
be guaranteed based on some mathematical models of
the users’ devices [1–3]. Unfortunately, the actual de-
vices do not necessarily follow mathematical models, and
we need to close the gap (side-channel) between the ac-
tual device and the mathematical model to implement
secure QKD systems in practice. Among side-channels,
the side-channel of a photon detector seems to be most
easily exploited by an eavesdropper (Eve) since it accepts
any input from Eve who can generate an arbitrary opti-
cal state such that it causes an unexpected behavior in
the detector. In fact, the famous bright-pulse illumina-
tion attacks are based on side-channel in detectors [4].
In order to countermeasure such attacks, measurement-
device-independent (MDI) QKD [5] was proposed to
make BB84 [6] free from any possible side-channel in a
detector. In MDI QKD, Alice and Bob do not perform
any measurement but only send quantum signals to be
measured by Eve. Therefore, bit strings generated by
Alice and Bob are free from side-channels in photon de-
tectors since they do not employ photon detectors. Since
its invention, MDI QKD has been actively studied both
theoretically [7, 8] and experimentally [9, 10].
As is the case in prepare & measure scheme, imple-
mentation of protocols other than BB84 in MDI setting
could be suitable for some practical situations. In fact,
many experiments for non-BB84 type prepare & mea-
sure schemes, including B92 [11], DPS QKD [12], coher-
ent one-way protocol [13], SARG04 [14], etc, have been
reported [15]. Therefore, it is useful in practice to use
non-BB84 type protocols in MDI setting, and in this pa-
per we consider to use SARG04 protocol in MDI set-
ting, which we refer to as MDI SARG04. SARG04 was
originally proposed to make BB84 robust against photon
number splitting (PNS) attacks [16, 17] just by changing
the classical post-processing part in BB84. It is proven
that SARG04 can indeed generate a key from two-photon
emission event by Alice in addition to single-photon emis-
sion event [18, 19], showing robustness against PNS at-
tack in some parameter regimes. Note in MDI setting is
that both Alice and Bob are the sender of the signals,
and as a result, the information leakage from the signals
seems to be larger than the one in prepare & measure
setting. Therefore, it is not trivial whether both single
and two-photon emission events can contribute to the
key generation or not. Our work answers this question,
and we have found that the single-photon emission event
by both Alice and Bob, or single-photon and two-photon
emission by each of Alice and Bob can contribute to gen-
erating a key, but two-photon emission by the two par-
ties cannot make the contribution when a probability of
Eve’s announcement of the successful measurement for
the two-photon emission event is smaller than 1/16.
Another important issue to be addressed in MDI set-
ting is what kind of measurement setup should be im-
plemented experimentally at Eve’s laboratory. Naively
thinking, as SARG04 differs from BB84 only in the post-
processing part, the same measurement setup for MDI
BB84 should also work for MDI-SARG04 protocol. On
the contrary, however, it turns out that the measurement
setup for MDI BB84 results in high bit error rate when
applied to MDI-SARG04 protocol, and consequently, no
significant key can be generated. To generate a key
in practice, we propose two alternative measurement
schemes for the MDI-SARG04 protocol, and simulate the
resulting key generation rate.
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FIG. 1: Schematic of an experimental setup for the MDI-
SARG04 QKD. The role of Eve’s measurement unit (MU) is
to perform entangling operation on the photons from Alice
and Bob, which is implemented by using a half beamsplit-
ter (BS) followed by polarization BSs (PBSs) and photon de-
tectors. We note that the PBS passes the photons in 45◦
polarization and reflects the photons in −45◦ polarization.
RESULTS
MDI-SARG04 QKD protocol
In this section, we introduce the MDI-SARG04 QKD
protocol. First, we summarize the assumptions and
mathematical definitions made in this paper, and then
we describe how the protocol runs.
Assumptions and definitions
We assume that each of Alice and Bob has a phase
randomized photon source, i.e. the vacuum, a sin-
gle photon, and multi photons are emitted probabilis-
tically. The probabilities of the n-photon emission from
Alice and Bob are pn and pn′ , respectively, which satisfy∑
n pn =
∑
n′ pn′ = 1. We encode the bit information in
polarization of photons, and we assume that the prepa-
ration of the polarization is precise without any flaw.
For simplicity, we consider the asymptotic case to ne-
glect any statistical fluctuation, i.e., the number of the
signals sent by Alice and Bob is infinite. In our paper,
horizontal and vertical polarization states of a single pho-
ton are represented by Z-basis qubit states, namely |0z〉
and |1z〉, respectively. We also define X (rectilinear)-
basis states as |ix〉 = (|0z〉 + (−1)i|1z〉)/
√
2 for i = 0, 1.
By using a creation operator a†θ for a single photon in
a polarization θ and the vacuum state |vac〉, we denote
an n-photon number state with polarization θ by |nθ〉 =
(a†θ)
n|vac〉/
√
n!. (note that when the subscript θ is z
or x, it refers to the qubit state rather than the photon
number state). Other definitions we use are as follows:
successful event output
Type1 (DLD&DRD¯ or DRD&DLD¯) |ψ
−〉
Type2 (DLD&DLD¯ or DRD&DRD¯) |ψ
+〉
TABLE I: Two types of the successful events announced
by Eve’s MU. Type1 is the coincidence detection events of
DLD&DRD¯ or DRD&DLD¯ denoted in Fig. 1. Type2 is the co-
incidence detection events of DLD&DLD¯ or DRD&DRD¯. When
the successful events are Type1 and Type2, Alice and Bob
distill the states |ψ−〉 and |ψ+〉, respectively, in the virtual
protocol.
|ϕi〉 = cos(pi/8)|0x〉 + (−1)i sin(pi/8)|1x〉 for i = 0, 1 and
|ϕi〉 = sin(pi/8)|0x〉 + (−1)i−1 cos(pi/8)|1x〉 for i = 2, 3.
R = exp(−pi/2Y ), where Y = −i|0z〉〈1z| + i|1z〉〈0z|,
which satisfies Ra†ϕiR
† = a†ϕi+1(mod4) for all i. |ψ±〉 =
(|0x1x〉 ± |1x0x〉)/
√
2 and |φ+〉 = (|0x0x〉 + |1x1x〉)/
√
2.
We denote P (·) = (·)(·)†.
The protocol of the MDI-SARG04 QKD
The protocol runs as follows:
(a1) Alice and Bob choose a bit value i and i′ (i, i′ =
0, 1), respectively, and they encode the bit value into the
photonic states of their pulses as
∑
n pn|nϕi〉〈nϕi | and∑
n′ pn′ |n′ϕi′ 〉〈n′ϕi′ |.
(a2) Alice and Bob rotate the polarization of their
pulses by applying rotation Rk and Rk′ with randomly-
chosen values of k(= 0, 1, 2, 3) and k′(= 0, 1, 2, 3), re-
spectively, where Rk is defined by Rk ≡ Rk. After the
rotation, Alice and Bob send the pulses to Eve’s mea-
surement unit (MU) through quantum channels.
(a3) Eve performs a measurement on the incoming
pulses and announces to Alice and Bob over the authenti-
cated public channel whether her measurement outcome
is successful or not. When the outcome is successful,
she also announces types of the successful events, either
Type1 or Type2.
(a4) Alice and Bob broadcast k and k′, over the au-
thenticated public channel. If the measurement outcome
in (a3) is successful with Type1 and k = k′ = 0, . . . , 3,
they keep their bit values i and i′ in (a1), and Alice flips
her bit. If the measurement outcome in (a3) is successful
with Type2 and k = k′ = 0, 2, they keep their bit values
i and i′ in (a1). In all the other cases, they discard their
bit values.
(a5) Alice and Bob repeat from (a1) to (a4) until the
number of the successful events with rotation k = k′ =
0, . . . , 3 in Type1 becomes N1 and k = k
′ = 0, 2 in
Type2 becomes N2. Let NiQ
tot
i be the number of the
successful detection event of Type i. Alice and Bob an-
nounce randomly-chosen NiQ
tot
i ζ bits over the authen-
ticated public channel, where ζ is much smaller than 1,
and estimate the error rate etoti in the remaining code
3bits. The estimated number of the bit error in the code
bits is denoted by etoti NiQ
tot
i (1− ζ).
(a6) Alice and Bob perform error correction and pri-
vacy amplification on the remaining NiQ
tot
i (1−ζ) bits by
their discussion over the public channel. As a result, they
share a final key of length G1N1(1− ζ) +G2N2(1− ζ).
At Eve’s MU in (a3), honest Eve performs the Bell
measurement in order to establish quantum correlations
between Alice and Bob to generate the key. In Fig. 1,
the experimental setup for the Bell measurement is de-
picted. It employs a half beam splitter (BS), two polar-
ization BSs (PBSs), and the photon detectors. In the
case where both Alice and Bob emit a single photon, the
simultaneous photon detection events matching the pat-
tern Type1 (Type2), listed in Table I, corresponds to the
detection of |ψ−〉 (|ψ+〉). We emphasize that in the se-
curity proof we assume that Eve is malicious and has a
control over the quantum channels, and all the bit errors
are attributed to the consequence of the eavesdropping.
Limitation of the experimental setup
In prepare & measure setting, the SARG04 protocol
is different from the BB84 protocol only in the post-
processing part, i.e., no modification is needed in the
experimental setup. In the MDI setting, however, the
experimental setup for the BB84 protocols [5] cannot be
directly used in MDI-SARG04 as it induces a high bit
error rate, and this is a significant qualitative difference
of MDI setting from prepare & measure setting, imply-
ing that not all the prepare & measure QKD protocols
cannot be directly converted to MDI setting. Therefore,
we need to consider an alternative experimental scheme
for MDI-SARG04. In this section, we first discuss why
the setup for MDI-BB84 gives the high bit error rate,
and then we propose alternative experimental schemes
for MDI-SARG04.
For the explanation we denote by F (n,m) the joint
probability that Eve receives n andm photons from Alice
and Bob, respectively, and obtains the successful mea-
surement outcome. Note that while we do not deal with
the types of Eve’s successful outcomes separately, the fol-
lowing discussion is valid for both types. For simplicity,
we neglect all the losses, including those in the quantum
channel and the photon detectors, and therefore we can
also regard F (n,m) as Q(n,m), which is the joint probabil-
ity that Alice and Bob respectively emit n and m pho-
tons and Eve obtains the successful measurement out-
come. Like in the MDI-BB84 protocols, we assume that
Alice and Bob use a phase randomized weak coherent
light whose average photon number is much smaller than
1. Thus, we have Q(1,1)/2 ∼ Q(2,0) ∼ Q(0,2) ≫ Q(n,m)
for n +m ≥ 3. For simplicity, we assume Eve is honest,
namely the bit error rate for n = m = 1 is zero, and
all photon detectors have unit quantum efficiency and no
(a) (b)
Eve’s MU
QND QND
FIG. 2: Two experimental setups for generating the key in
the MDI-SARG04 protocol. Both setups significantly elim-
inate the events caused by (n,m) = (2, 0), (0, 2) and other
problematic photon number configurations. (a) Eve performs
the QND measurements on the pulses from Alice and Bob,
and she does not perform the interference measurement for
n ≥ 2 or m ≥ 2. Eve accepts only when n ≤ 1 and m ≤ 1
are satisfied. (b) A quasi single-photon source used by Alice
and Bob, which is composed of the heralded SPDC process.
When detector D0 clicks, Alice/Bob sends her/his pulse at
the remaining mode to Eve’s MU.
dark counting. In the following, we show that even with
this simplification favorable to Alice and Bob, no signif-
icant key is expected. To see this, we consider the bit
error rate, and the total bit error rate etot is expected to
be
etot ∼ Q
(2,0)e
(2,0)
bit +Q
(0,2)e
(0,2)
bit
Q(1,1) +Q(2,0) +Q(0,2)
, (1)
where e
(n,m)
bit is the bit error probability under the condi-
tion that Alice emits n photons and Bob emits m pho-
tons, and Eve announces the successful outcome. Note
that equation (1) holds in both the MDI-BB84 and MDI-
SARG04 protocols. It is clear from equation (1) that the
bit error is caused by the case where one party emits
two photons and the other party emits the vacuum. It
is also clear that e
(2,0)
bit cannot be zero since the vacuum
emission carries no bit information. In the case of MDI-
BB84, this event is always discarded from the sifted key,
and consequently the bit error rate in the key generation
basis, i.e., rectilinear basis, is zero. This is so because the
two-photon states |245◦〉 and |2−45◦〉, which contribute
to the bit values, are orthogonal and they never produce
the successful outcomes in Eve’s projection measurement
for the basis {|0x〉, |1x〉}. Therefore, in the experiment of
MDI-BB84, the bit error rate is very small. In the case of
MDI-SARG04, however, two states |2ϕ0〉 and |2ϕ1〉 con-
sisting bit values are not orthogonal. This means that the
two-photon emission contributes to the successful out-
come. More precisely, etot ∼ e(0,2)bit /2 = 0.25 holds from
the direct calculation of e
(2,0)
bit = e
(0,2)
bit = 0.5 [29]. There-
fore, we conclude that the use of the phase randomized
coherent light source gives no significant key in MDI-
SARG04. In order to generate a key in the MDI-SARG04
protocol, Eve’s MU or the photon sources should be mod-
4ified such that the probability of obtaining the successful
outcome due to the two photons and the vacuum state is
suppressed. In order to suppress the probability, we pro-
pose two experimental setups: (i) Eve performs quantum
nondemolition (QND) measurement on the two incom-
ing pulses from Alice and Bob just before mixing them
as shown in Fig. 2(a). The QND measurement discrim-
inates whether the photon number in the pulse is 0, 1
or more. Eve accepts only the case where n ≤ 1 and
m ≤ 1 and discards the other cases with multiple pho-
tons. Thanks to the QND measurement, the total bit
error rate is suppressed even if the phase randomized
coherent light is used as a photon source. (ii) With-
out the modification of Eve’s MU, Alice and Bob replace
the phase randomized coherent light by a heralded single
photon source based on a spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) and a threshold photon detector (see
Fig. 2(b)). This dramatically reduces the probabilities
of the events of (n,m) = (2, 0) and (0, 2). We will show
that these setups enable us to generate the key later.
Security Proof
In this section, we discuss the unconditional security
proof (i.e., the security proof against most general at-
tacks) of our scheme. The security proof is independent
of the specific device models like in Fig. 2, namely it is
valid for any Eve’s MU and any photon sources of Alice
and Bob. Our proof employs the security proof based
on the entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) [3, 20],
where the distillation of |ψ−〉 is considered for Type1
and that of |ψ+〉 is considered for Type2. The proposed
EDP-based virtual protocol, which is equivalent to the
MDI-SARG04 QKD from Eve’s viewpoint, runs as fol-
lows.
(v1) Alice and Bob prepare |Φn(m),k(k′)〉A1(B1),A2(B2),
where |Φn,k〉Γ1,Γ2 = (|0z〉Γ1 |nϕk〉Γ2+|1z〉Γ1 |nϕ1+k〉Γ2)/
√
2
for Γ=A,B. Here k(= 0, 1, 2, 3) and k′(= 0, 1, 2, 3) are
randomly chosen. The probability distribution of the
photon number is equal to that of the photon source in
the actual protocol. Alice and Bob send the n and m
photon states in A2 and B2 to Eve’s MU, respectively.
(v2) Eve performs a measurement on the photons com-
ing from Alice and Bob, and announces to them whether
the measurement is successful (including the type of the
event) or not. If the measurement result is not successful,
Alice and Bob discard their qubits.
(v3) Alice and Bob broadcast the labels k and k′, re-
spectively. In the cases of k = k′ = 1, 3 with the an-
nouncement of Type2 or k 6= k′, Alice and Bob discard
their qubits.
(v4) Alice and Bob repeat (v1) – (v3) many times until
the number of the successful events for k = k′ becomes
Ni for i = 1, 2, where i corresponds to the type of the
events.
(v5) Let NiQ
tot
i be the number of the successful detec-
tion event for Type i. Alice and Bob announce randomly
chosenNiQ
tot
i ζ-photon pairs over the authenticated pub-
lic channel, where ζ is much smaller than 1, and then
they perform Z-basis measurement on their qubits of
the chosen pairs. By sharing their measurement results
over the authenticated public channel, they estimate the
bit error rate on the code qubits denoted by etoti . As
a result, the number of the bit error is estimated to be
etoti NiQ
tot
i (1− ζ).
(v6) They estimate the upper bound on the phase error
rate e
(n,m)
i,ph for n and m photons from the bit error rate
e
(n,m)
i,bit for n and m photons. Here the phase error is
defined by the bit error that would have been obtained
if they had measured the qubit pairs by X basis, which
is the complementarity basis of the computational basis.
(v7) When the bit and the phase errors are smaller
than a threshold value for entanglement distillation, they
perform the distillation for NiQ
tot
i (1−ζ) qubit pairs. For
the cases of Type1 and Type2, they distill the photon
pairs in states |ψ−〉 and |ψ+〉, respectively. We denote the
number of the distilled maximally entangled qubit pairs
as GiNi(1 − ζ). Finally, by performing Z-measurements
on the distilled photon pairs, they obtain the key.
The important quantities in the proof is the bit and
phase errors, and the phase error rate determines the
amount of privacy amplification. The bit error rate in
the code bits of the virtual protocol, which is exactly the
same as the one of the actual protocol, is directly esti-
mated by test bits. On the other hand, the phase error
rate is defined by the complementary basis X , which Al-
ice and Bob never employ, and therefore this rate is not
directly estimated in the protocols. Note that we are al-
lowed to work on Alice’s n-photon emission and Bob’s
m-photon emission separately, because Alice’s and Bob’s
photon sources in the protocols are phase randomized.
In the following subsections, we present the estimation of
the phase error rates for the cases of Type1 and Type2
independently. We derive an upper bound on the phase
error e
(1,1)
i,ph for i = 1, 2, where the superscript (1, 1) de-
notes n = m = 1 and the subscript represents the type
of the successful outcome, and derive an upper bound
on the phase error e
(1,2)
i,ph . We show that in the case of
n = m = 2, no key can be generated when the probability
of Eve’s successful outcome for the two-photon emission
event is smaller than 1/16. We note that in the cases of
either n ≥ 3 or m ≥ 3, Eve can perform an unambiguous
state discrimination to one of the three-photon emission
part [21, 22], and thus we cannot extract the key from
such events, given that the channel is lossy enough.
Fnally, we note that given the phase error rates, Qtoti =∑
n,mQ
(n,m)
i and e
tot
i =
∑
n,mQ
(n,m)
i e
(n,m)
i,bit /Q
tot
i , the
5asymptotic key rate for Type i is written by [23]
Gi = Q
(1,1)
i [1− h(e(1,1)i,ph )] +Q(1,2)i [1− h(e(1,2)i,ph )]
+Q
(2,1)
i [1− h(e(2,1)i,ph )]− f(etoti )Qtoti h(etoti ). (2)
Here h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary
shannon entropy.
phase error estimation for (n,m) = (1, 1) and (1, 2)
By the analysis based on the virtual protocol, we give
the phase error estimation formula for (n,m) = (1, 1) and
(n,m) = (1, 2). The estimation is performed for Type1
and Type2, separately, and we detail the derivation of
the phase error estimation in Methods section.
In the case of Type 1, we have
e
(1,1)
1,ph =
3
2
e
(1,1)
1,bit (3)
for (n,m) = (1, 1) and
e
(1,2)
1,ph = mins1
{s1 e(1,2)1,bit + f(s1)} (4)
for (n,m) = (1, 2), where
f(s1) =
3− 2s1 +
√
6− 6√2s1 + 4s21
6
. (5)
In the case of Type 2, we have
e
(1,1)
2,ph ≤ 3e(1,1)2,bit (6)
for (n,m) = (1, 1) and
e
(1,2)
2,ph = mins2
{s2 e(1,2)2,bit + g(s2)} (7)
for (n,m) = (1, 2), where g(s2) is the maximal solution
of the following equation for x
4
√
2x3 + 2(1− 3
√
2 + 3
√
2s2)x
2
+ 2(−1 +
√
2 + (1− 3
√
2)s2 +
√
2s22)x
+ (
√
2− 1)s2 + (1 −
√
2)s22 = 0. (8)
We depict the dependencies of the phase error rates on
the bit error rates in Fig. 3.
Impossibility of generating a key from n = m = 2
For the case of n = m = 2, the key cannot be obtained
for n = m = 2 in Type1 and Type2 by giving an explicit
Eve’s attack which give a phase error of 0.5, as long as
the success probability of Eve’s measurement conditioned
that both Alice and Bob emit two photons is not larger
than 1/16. We show the proof in Methods section. We
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FIG. 3: The relations between the phase error rates and the
bit error rates (a) for (n,m) = (1, 1) and (b) for (n,m) =
(1, 2).
will prove that we cannot generate a key from n = m = 2
in the virtual protocol, and it follows that we cannot gen-
erate a key from n = m = 2 in the actual protocol either.
To see this, note that the virtual protocol differs from the
actual protocol only in the way to prepare the state, and
the state prepared and post data-processing are exactly
the same in both protocols. In other words, only the lo-
cal operation needed in state-preparation process by the
legitimated parties are different in the two protocols. By
recalling that any local operation cannot convert a sepa-
rable state into a non-separable state, we conclude that
if we cannot generate a key from a virtual protocol, then
we cannot generate a key from the actual protocol.
Simulation
Here we show the results of the key generation rate
for the two experimental setups as shown in Figs. 2(a)
and (b) by using typical experimental parameters taken
from Gobby-Yuan-Shields (GYS) experiment [24], where
the quantum efficiency and the dark counting of the all
detectors in Eve’s MU are η = 0.045 and d = 8.5× 10−7,
respectively, the loss coefficient of the quantum channel
is ξ = 0.21dB/km, and the inefficiency of the error cor-
recting code is 1.22. In the simulation, we use infinite
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FIG. 4: The key rate when Alice and Bob use coherent pulses
and Eve performs non-destructively exclusion of the multi-
photons from Alice and Bob. (a) Bottom: the key rate of the
MDI-SARG04 protocol from (n,m) = (1, 1) only. Middle:
the key rate of the MDI-SARG04 protocol from (n,m) =
(1, 1), (1, 2) and (2, 1). Top: the key rate of the MDI-BB84
protocol. (b) The upper and lower solid lines are the key rates
from (n,m) = (1, 1), (1, 2) and (2, 1) for Type1 and Type2,
respectively. The upper and lower dashed lines are the key
rates from (n,m) = (1, 1) for Type1 and Type2, respectively.
number of decoy states [25] in order to obtain Q
(1,1)
i ,
e
(1,1)
i,bit , Q
(1,2)
i and e
(1,2)
i,bit . Assuming that the bit error is
stemmed only from dark countings of the detectors, we
ignore the other imperfections such as the misalignment
of the devices. We also assume that the mean photon
numbers of the signal pulses prepared by Alice and Bob
are the same, and the MU in Eve is the middle of Alice
and Bob. The mean photon number for the signal is op-
timized for maximizing the key generation rate at each
distance. By using equation (2) with the above param-
eters and assumptions, we calculate the key generation
rate as a function of the distance between Alice and Bob
(i) when Eve postselects the events with n ≤ 1 andm ≤ 1
with the QND measurement as shown in Fig. 2(a) and
Alice and Bob use the coherent pulses, and (ii) when Eve
uses the MU in Fig. 1 and Alice and Bob use quasi single
photon sources prepared by the SPDC in Fig. 2(b).
Case (i) – The simulation result of the key rate is
shown in Fig. 4(a), and the mean photon number which
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FIG. 5: The optimal mean photon number for the key rate
in Fig. 4. For the key rates from (n,m) = (1, 1), the three
lines show the mean photon number when we consider only
Type1, both types and only Type2 from the top. The mean
photon numbers for the key rates from (n,m) = (1, 1), (1, 2)
and (2, 1) show a similar tendency. The dashed line is for the
MDI-BB84 protocol.
maximizes the key rate is shown in Fig. 5. We also plot
the key rates of Type1 and Type2 separately in Fig. 4(b).
The details for obtaining these figures are shown in Sup-
plementary. When the distance is zero, since there is
no photon loss before the BS and the multi-photon emis-
sions are excluded, the events of multi-photon input have
no contribution to the key rate. In fact, in Fig. 4(a),
the two key rates at zero distance obtained from only
(n,m) = (1, 1) and from both (n,m) = (1, 1), (1, 2) and
(2, 1) are exactly the same. When the distance becomes
longer, we see from Fig. 5 that the contribution of the
multi photons becomes larger. For the key rate from only
(n,m) = (1, 1), the mean photon number is monoton-
ically decrease because the multi-photon emissions give
only adverse effect. On the other hand, when we extract
the key additionally from the multi photons, the mean
photon number does not decrease monotonically, which
shows an advantage in using multi-photon emission.
Case (ii) – Alice and Bob use quasi single photon
sources by SPDC as shown in Fig. 2(b). Detector D0
is the same as that used in Eve’s MU, namely it is the
threshold detector with the quantum efficiency of η =
0.045 and the dark counting of d = 8.5 × 10−7. Eve’s
MU is the same as that shown in Fig. 1. The key rate
is shown in Fig. 6. The details for calculating the key
rates are shown in Supplementary. The mean photon
number which maximizes the key rate is shown in Fig. 7.
From Fig. 6, we see that the key rate only from Type1
and that both from Type1 and Type2 intersect. For the
distribution distance longer than the cross point, Type2
has no contribution of the key, which is shown by the blue
line in the figure, and therefore it is better to generate
a key from Type1 only. From Fig. 7, we see that the
mean photon number is very small. This is so because the
use of larger mean photon numbers results in two-photon
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FIG. 6: The key rate when Alice and Bob use quasi single-
photon sources prepared by the SPDC and Eve’s MU is the
same as the circuit used in the MDI-BB84 protocols. In
this case, the total the key is approximately obtained from
only the case of (n,m) = (1, 1), and the successful events
of (n,m) = (1, 2) and (n,m) = (2, 1) give little contribu-
tion to the key rate. This is so because the probability of
the two-photon component in the heralded photon source is
negligibly small compared with the probability of the single-
photon component. The lines are for MDI-BB84 (black), for
both types (red), Type1 (green) and Type2 (blue) of the MDI-
SARG04.
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FIG. 7: The optimal mean photon number for the key rate
in Fig. 6. The upper line (black) is the mean photon number
for the MDI-BB84 protocol. The lower three lines are for
the key rates of the MDI-SARG04 protocol obtained from
Type1 (green), both types (red) and Type2 (blue) from the
top.
emission, which increases the bit error rate. From all the
figures of the key rate, one sees that the key rates of
MDI-SARG04 are lower than those of MDI-BB84. This
tendency holds also for prepare & measure SARG04 [18,
26], and the higher phase error rates of SARG04 protocol
than that of BB84 is the main reason of this tendency.
DISCUSSION
In recent years, many proposals and experimental
demonstrations of the MDI QKD have been studied. So
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FIG. 8: Schematic that is equivalent to the EDP for n = m =
1. While Eve accesses only the photons in modes A2 and B2
in the actual protocol, we pessimistically suppose that she can
prepare any state in A′1 and B
′
1 for simplicity of the proof.
far, all of them except for the continuous-variable QKD
protocol [27] are based on the BB84 protocol. We first
proved the unconditional security of the MDI QKD based
on the SARG04 protocol. In our security proof, we gave
the upper bounds on the phase error rate when Alice
and Bob emit single photons and when one party emit
one photon and the other half emit two photons. For
the case of the two photon emissions from both parties,
we proved that a key cannot be generated as long as the
probability of success in her measurement conditioned
that both Alice and Bob emit two photons is not larger
than 1/16. Another important issue to be addressed in
MDI setting is what kind of measurement should be im-
plemented experimentally at Eve’s laboratory. We have
shown that the measurement setup for BB84 in MDI set-
ting cannot be used in SARG04 in MDI setting, and we
proposed two measurement schemes for MDI SARG04.
In the first one, Alice and Bob use heralded single photon
sources prepared by SPDC. In the second one, Eve per-
forms QND measurement on the two pulses coming from
Alice and Bob individually. In our simulation based on
these experimental setups, it was confirmed that these
setup can generate a key.
METHODS
Proof of phase error estimation for n = m = 1
Here, we give the phase error estimation for n =
m = 1. For this, it is convenient to recall a mathe-
matical property of the maximally entangled state that
(I1 ⊗M2)|φ+〉12 = (MT1 ⊗ I2)|φ+〉12 is satisfied for any
operator M . Therefore |Φ1,k〉A1A2 in (v1) is expressed
as |Φ1,k〉A1A2 ∝ F1,A′1RTk,A′1 |φ
+〉A′1A2 , where F1,A′1 =
cos(pi/8)|0x〉A1〈0x|A′1 +sin(pi/8)|1x〉A1〈1x|A′1 . Physically,
this identification can be interpreted as the situation
where |φ+〉 is prepared by each of the parties, the fil-
tering operation, of which successful case is described by
F1, is applied, and then each party sends the photons
to Eve only when the filtering operation succeeds (also
see Fig. 8). For the simplicity of the security proof, we
make an overestimation of Eve’s ability in terms of the
accessibility of the photons, namely, we imagine Eve who
has a direct access to photons of A′1 and B
′
1 rather than
8A2 and B2, and she can prepare any joint state of the
photons of A′1 and B
′
1. For later convenience, we denote
by ρ
(1,1)
A′1B
′
1|suc
the state prepared by Eve.
In the following, we first discuss the case of Type1. We
define e˜
(1,1)
1,bit/ph = tr(Π
(1,1)
1,bit/phρ
(1,1)
A′1B
′
1|suc
) as the joint prob-
ability that the photons in ρ
(1,1)
A′1B
′
1|suc
pass through the
filtering operation and induces a bit/phase error to the
state |ψ−〉 after the rotation. Here Π(1,1)1,bit and Π(1,1)1,ph are
POVM elements of the bit and phase error measurements
on ρ
(1,1)
A′1B
′
1|suc
, respectively. The probability that the two
photons in ρ
(1,1)
A′1B
′
1|suc
pass through the successful filter-
ing operation is described by p
(1,1)
1,fil = tr(Π
(1,1)
1,fil ρ
(1,1)
A′1B
′
1|suc
),
where the POVM element of the successful filtering op-
eration on the two photons is
Π
(1,1)
1,fil =
1
4
3∑
k=0
P (Rk,A′1F
T
1,A′1
Rk,B′1F
T
1,B′1
), (9)
where P (·) = (·)(·)†. The POVMs for the bit and the
phase errors are written as
Π
(1,1)
1,bit/ph =
1
4
1∑
i=0
3∑
k=0
P (Rk,A′1F
T
1,A′1
|iz/x〉A1
⊗Rk,B′1FT1,B′1 |iz/x〉B1). (10)
Applying the Bayes’ rule, the bit error rate e
(1,1)
1,bit and the
phase error rate e
(1,1)
1,ph in the final state in modes A1 and
B1 are described by
e
(1,1)
1,bit/ph =
e˜
(1,1)
1,bit/ph
p
(1,1)
1,fil
. (11)
The phase error estimation can be established by directly
writing down the explicit form of equation (10) compar-
ing each matrix element, and one can conclude that
Π
(1,1)
1,ph =
3
2
Π
(1,1)
1,bit . (12)
Thus from equations (9) and (11), the phase error rate is
precisely estimated, by using the bit error rate, as shown
in equation (3). Thanks to Azuma’s inequality [28], equa-
tion (3) holds for any eavesdropping including coherent
attacks.
Next, we estimate the phase error rate for Type2. Be-
cause only the cases of k = k′ = 0, 2 are accepted for
Type2, the definition of the POVM element of the suc-
cessful filtering operation is changed to
Π
(1,1)
2,fil =
1
2
∑
k=0,2
P (Rk,A′1F
T
1,A′1
Rk,B′1F
T
1,B′1
), (13)
and the probability that the two photons in ρ
(1,1)
A′1B
′
1|suc
pass
through the successful filtering operation is expressed by
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FIG. 9: Schematic which is equivalent to the EDP for n =
1 and m = 2. By Eve’s announcement for the successful
measurement on the photons in A2, B2 and B4, the three-
photon state ρ
(1,2)
A′1B
′
1B
′
3|suc
is prepared.
p
(1,1)
2,fil = tr(Π
(1,1)
2,fil ρ
(1,1)
A′1B
′
1|suc
). We describe a joint proba-
bility that the two photons in ρ
(1,1)
A′1B
′
1|suc
pass through the
successful filtering operation after the rotation and then
the photons in modes A1 and B1 have a bit/phase er-
ror to the state |ψ+〉 by e˜(1,1)2,bit/ph = tr(Π
(1,1)
2,bit/phρ
(1,1)
A′1B
′
1|suc
).
Like in the case of Type1, the POVM elements of Π
(1,1)
2,bit
and Π
(1,1)
2,ph are written by
Π
(1,1)
2,bit =
1
2
1∑
i=0
∑
k=0,2
P (Rk,A′1F
T
1,A′1
|iz〉A1
⊗Rk,B′1FT1,B′1 |i⊕ 1z〉B1) (14)
and
Π
(1,1)
2,ph =
1
2
1∑
i=0
∑
k=0,2
P (Rk,A′1F
T
1,A′1
|ix〉A1
⊗Rk,B′1FT1,B′1 |ix〉B1). (15)
By using the Bayes’ rule, the bit/phase error rate of
e
(1,1)
2,bit/ph in the final state is expressed by
e
(1,1)
2,bit/ph =
e˜
(1,1)
2,bit/ph
p
(1,1)
2,fil
. (16)
In order to see the relation between the bit and phase
error rates, we consider an inequality to bound the phase
error as se
(1,1)
2,bit − e(1,1)2,ph ≥ 0, where s is a real num-
ber, which is equivalent to sΠ
(1,1)
2,bit − Π(1,1)2,ph ≥ 0 for
p
(1,1)
2,fil > 0. By considering a non-negativity condition
of sΠ
(1,1)
2,bit −Π(1,1)2,ph ≥ 0, we see that this inequality always
holds when s ≥ 3, and therefore, we have the relation
between the phase error rate and the bit error as shown
in equation (6).
Proof of phase error estimation for n = 1 and m = 2
Below, we give the phase error estimation for
n = 1 and m = 2. By using the similar argument as
n = m = 1, |Φ2,k〉B1,B2 at Bob’s side in (v1) is defined by
9〈0x|B3F2,B′1B′3RTk,B′1R
T
k,B′3
|φ+〉B′1B2 |φ+〉B′3B4 as in Fig. 9,
where F2,B′1B′3 = cos
2(pi/8)|0x0x〉B1B3〈0x0x|B′1B′3 +
sin2(pi/8)|0x0x〉B1B3〈1x1x|B′1B′3 +√
2 cos(pi/8) sin(pi/8)|1x0x〉B1B3〈ψ+|B′1B′3 . Here we
note that two-photon emission part is simulated by
preparing two pairs of |φ+〉 followed by the rotation and
the filtering operation on two qubits (see also Fig. 9). In
this virtual protocol, while we consider two photons in
different modes, this never underestimates Eve’s ability.
This is so because two photons in the different modes
and two photons in a single mode can be converted just
by an unitary transformation as |ϕi〉B2 |ϕi〉B4 → |2ϕi〉B2 .
We note that because the photon in mode B3 is in |0x〉
after the filtering operation, and it is decoupled from
all the other systems, the component is not related to
the security proof. Again, we employ the overestimation
that Eve has the control over the state of the systems
of A′1, B
′
1 and B
′
3, and we denote the three-photon
state by ρ
(1,2)
A′1B
′
1B
′
3|suc
, which is prepared by Eve after
her announcement of the success. Like in the case for
n = m = 1, we estimate a phase error for each case of
Type1 and Type2 separately.
For Type1, define a POVM element of the successful
filtering operations on ρ
(1,2)
A′1B
′
1B
′
3|suc
as
Π
(1,2)
1,fil =
1
4
3∑
k=0
P (Rk,A′1F
T
1,A′1
Rk,B′1Rk,B′3F
T
2,B′1B
′
3
). (17)
Here the probability of the successful filtering operation
is written by p
(1,2)
1,fil = tr(Π
(1,2)
1,fil ρ
(1,2)
A′1B
′
1B
′
3|suc
). We define
e˜
(1,2)
1,bit/ph = tr(Π
(1,2)
1,bit/phρ
(1,2)
A′1B
′
1B
′
3|suc
) as a joint probability
that the photons in ρ
(1,2)
A′1B
′
1B
′
3|suc
pass through the filter-
ing operation and induces a bit/phase error to the state
|ψ−〉 after the rotation. the successful filtering operation
after the rotation is performed on the two photons in
ρ
(1,2)
A′1B
′
1B
′
3|suc
and then the photons in modes A1 and B1
have a bit/phase error to the state |ψ−〉. Here, POVM
elements of Π
(1,2)
1,bit/ph are written by
Π
(1,2)
1,bit/ph =
1
4
1∑
i=0
3∑
k=0
P (Rk,A′1F
T
1,A′1
|iz/x〉A1
⊗Rk,B′1Rk,B′3FT2,B′1B′3 |iz/x〉B1 |0x〉B3 ).(18)
The actual bit error rate e
(1,2)
1,bit and phase error rate e
(1,2)
1,ph
for n = 1 and m = 2 are obtained by accommodating the
normalization by p
(1,2)
1,fil , and they are expressed as
e
(1,2)
1,bit/ph =
e˜
(1,2)
1,bit/ph
p
(1,2)
1,fil
. (19)
In order to see the relation between the bit and phase
error rates, we consider an inequality to bound the
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FIG. 10: Schematic which is equivalent to the EDP for
n = m = 2. By Eve’s announcement for the successful mea-
surement on the photons in A2, A4, B2 and B4, the four-
photon state ρ
(2,2)
A′1A
′
3B
′
1B
′
3|suc
is prepared.
phase error as e
(1,2)
1,ph ≤ s1e(1,2)1,bit + t1, where s1 and t1
are real numbers. By using equations (17) – (19), and
the linearity of the trace, we obtain an inequality as
s1Π
(1,2)
1,bit + t1Π
(1,2)
1,fil −Π(1,2)1,ph ≥ 0, which is satisfied when
t1 ≥ f(s1) =
3− 2s1 +
√
6− 6√2s1 + 4s21
6
. (20)
Therefore the phase error rate is given by using the bit
error as shown in equation (4).
For Type2, we define a POVM element Π
(1,2)
2,fil of the
successful filtering operation by limiting the summation
only to k = 0, 2 and by replacing 1/4 with 1/2 in equa-
tion (17). The probability of the successful filtering
operation is described by p
(1,2)
2,fil = tr(Π
(1,2)
2,fil ρ
(1,2)
A′1B
′
1B
′
3|suc
).
We also define joint probabilities of ρ
(1,2)
A′1B
′
1B
′
3|suc
passing
through the filtering and presenting bit and phase errors
to the state |ψ+〉 by e˜(1,2)2,bit = tr(Π(1,2)2,bitρ(1,2)A′1B′1B′3|suc) and
e˜
(1,2)
2,ph = tr(Π
(1,2)
2,ph ρ
(1,2)
A′1B
′
1B
′
3|suc
). We define the POVM ele-
ment of Π
(1,2)
2,ph by limiting the summation only to k = 0, 2
and replacing 1/4 with 1/2 in equation (18), and that
of Π
(1,2)
2,bit is defined by limiting the summation only to
k = 0, 2, replacing 1/4 with 1/2, and |iz〉 with |i ⊕ 1z〉
for mode B1. In a similar manner as the case of Type1
for n = 1 and m = 2, by using the bit error rate de-
fined by e
(1,2)
2,bit = e˜
(1,2)
2,bit/p
(1,2)
2,fil , the phase error rate as
e
(1,2)
2,ph = e˜
(1,2)
2,ph /p
(1,2)
2,fil and real numbers s2 and t2, we con-
sider an inequality as e
(1,2)
2,ph ≤ s2e(1,2)2,bit + t2, which leads
to s2Π
(1,2)
2,bit + t2Π
(1,2)
2,fil − Π(1,2)2,ph ≥ 0. From this inequality,
we obtain t2 ≥ g(s2), where g(s2) is the maximal solu-
tion of equation (8). Using g(s2), we have the relation
between the phase error rate and the bit error as shown
in equation (7).
Proof of impossibility of generating a key from n = m = 2
For the case of n = m = 2, like in the previ-
ous subsection, |Φ2,k〉A1,A2 at Alice’s side in (v1) is
obtained by 〈0x|A3F2,A′1A′3RTk,A′1R
T
k,A′3
|φ+〉A′1A2 |φ+〉A′3A4 ,
and |Φ2,k〉B1,B2 at Bob’s side is prepared by the same
10
manner. As a result, the virtual protocol for n = m = 2
is equivalent to the successful situation of the filtering
operations, which we depict in Fig. 10. We denote the
state of Alice’s and Bob’s four qubits after Eve’s success-
ful announcement by ρ
(2,2)
A′1A
′
3B
′
1B
′
3|suc
. In the following, we
prove that the key cannot be obtained for n = m = 2 by
giving an explicit Eve’s attack, namely we give explicit
states of A′1, A
′
3, B
′
1 and B
′
3 which give a phase error of
0.5. The key ingredient is that while Eve cannot manip-
ulate these four qubits, she conclusively prepare such a
state on their qubits by announcing the success of her
measurement only when she succeeds an eavesdropping
measurement on Eve’s photons A2, A4, B2 and B4. This
attack gives Eve the perfect information on the bit values
when her measurement succeeds.
For Type1, the probability of the successful filtering
operation is expressed by p
(2,2)
1,fil = tr(Π
(2,2)
1,fil ρ
(2,2)
A′1A
′
3B
′
1B
′
3|suc
),
where
Π
(2,2)
1,fil =
1
4
3∑
k=0
P (Rk,A′1Rk,A′3F
T
2,A′1A
′
3
Rk,B′1Rk,B′3F
T
2,B′1B
′
3
).
(21)
The joint probability, that the filtering operation
succeeds and the bit/phase error to the state
|ψ−〉 is detected, is expressed by e˜(2,2)1,bit/ph =
tr(Π
(2,2)
1,bit/phρ
(2,2)
A′1A
′
3B
′
1B
′
3|suc
), where
Π
(2,2)
1,bit/ph =
1
4
1∑
i=0
3∑
k=0
P (Rk,A′1Rk,A′3F
T
2,A′1A
′
3
|iz/x〉A1 |0x〉A3
⊗Rk,B′1Rk,B′3FT2,B′1B′3 |iz/x〉B1 |0x〉B3). (22)
The bit/phase error rate is expressed as e
(2,2)
1,bit/ph =
e˜
(2,2)
1,bit/ph/p
(2,2)
1,fil . One can confirm by direct calcu-
lation that a four-photon state of |µ1〉A′1B′1A′3B′3 =
|ψ−〉A′1B′3 |0x1x〉A′3B′1 gives e
(2,2)
1,bit = 0 and e
(2,2)
1,ph =
0.5, and another four-photon state |µ2〉A′1B′1A′3B′3 =
(|0z0z1z0z〉A′1A′3B′1B′3 + |1z0z0z1z〉A′1A′3B′1B′3)/
√
2, which is
orthogonal to |µ1〉A′1B′1A′3B′3 , gives e
(2,2)
1,bit = 0.5 and e
(2,2)
1,ph =
0.5. Therefore, although Eve cannot touch the four
modes A′1, B
′
1, A
′
3 and B
′
3, Eve can prepare the two
states by a projective measurement on the four pho-
tons in A2, B2, A4 and B4 as {P (|µ1〉), P (|µ2〉), I −∑2
i=1 P (|µi〉)}. One sees this fact from the equa-
tion A2B2A4B4 〈µi|φ+〉A′1A2 |φ
+〉B′1B2 |φ+〉A′3A4 |φ+〉B′3B4 =
|µi〉A′1B′1A′3B′3/
√
16, which also implies that the prepara-
tion succeeds with a probability of 1/16. Thus a ma-
licious Eve achieves the phase error rate of 0.5 for any
bit error rate by distributing these states with a relevant
probability. This means that the state in A1 and B1 is
separable, and it follows that no key can be generated for
q
(2,2)
1 ≤ 1/16, where q(2,2)i is the probability of Eve’s suc-
cessful detection of Type i conditioned that both Alice
and Bob emit two photons.
For Type2, with the same fashion as the case of n = 1
and m = 2, POVM elements Π
(2,2)
2,fil for the successful
filtering operation and Π
(2,2)
2,bit/ph for the bit/phase error
are defined by replacing the summation range of k, the
prefactor and the proper inversion of the bit value of the
projection in equations (21) and (22). We consider the
following four orthogonal four-photon states for systems
A′1, B
′
1, A
′
3 and B
′
3 |ν1〉A′1B′1A′3B′3 = |ψ+〉A′1B′1 |0x0x〉A′3B′3 ,|ν2〉A′1B′1A′3B′3 = |ψ+〉A′1B′1 |0x1x〉A′3B′3 , |ν3〉A′1B′1A′3B′3 =|ψ+〉A′1B′1 |1x0x〉A′3B′3 and |ν4〉A′1B′1A′3B′3 =|ψ−〉A′1B′1 |0x0x〉A′3B′3 . Each state can be
prepared by Eve’s projective measurement
{P (|ν1〉), P (|ν2〉), P (|ν3〉), P (|ν4〉), I −
∑4
i=1 P (|νi〉)}
on the four photons in A2, B2, A4 and B4 with a prob-
ability of 1/16. By calculating the error probabilities,
we see that mixed states 0.25|ν1〉〈ν1| + 0.75|ν2〉〈ν2| and
0.75|ν3〉〈ν3| + 0.25|ν4〉〈ν4| give (e(2,2)2,bit , e(2,2)2,ph ) = (0, 0.5)
and (e
(2,2)
2,bit , e
(2,2)
2,ph ) = (0.5, 0.5), respectively. Therefore
Eve achieves any bit error rate below 0.5 while keeping
e
(2,2)
2,ph = 0.5 by distributing the above two mixed states
with an appropriate probability. As a result, we conclude
that for q
(2,2)
2 ≤ 1/16, the key cannot be obtained.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: DETAILS OF THE SIMULATION
Here we describe the details of our simulation. The quantum efficiency and the dark counting of the detectors are
η = 0.045 and d = 8.5× 10−7, respectively. The loss coefficient of the quantum channel is ξ = 0.21dB/km. We denote
a = cos(pi/8) and b = sin(pi/8). We define that p
(n,m)
i,ab is a probability that the photons are detected as the successful
event of Type i conditioned that Alice and Bob emit n and m photons in the states |ϕa〉 and |ϕb〉 for a, b = 0, . . . , 3,
respectively. qi,ab is the probability of the successful detection of Type i conditioned that Alice and Bob emit photons
in |ϕa〉 and |ϕb〉, respectively. Assuming that Eve is in the middle of Alice and Bob, the channel transmittance to
Eve from Alice is the same as that from Bob. Denoting that l is the distance between Alice and Bob, the channel
transmittance for Alice and Bob is
T = 10−ξ0.5l/10. (23)
In the following, we give the experimental data for the simulation (i) when Eve postselects the events with n ≤ 1 and
m ≤ 1 by the QND measurement before mixing the pulses from Alice and Bob (see Fig. 2(a)), and (ii) when Alice
and Bob use quasi single photon sources by the SPDC (see Fig. 2(b)).
Case (i) Eve performs the QND measurement.
Each of Alice and Bob uses a phase randomized weak coherent pulse with the mean photon number of µ. The
probability pn for n-photon emission is
pn(µ) = e
−µµ
n
n!
. (24)
For later use, we define the equations
f1 = (1 − d)2(2η2a2b2(1 + 3d) + 2η(1− η)d + 2(1− η)2d2), (25)
f2 = f1 − (1− d)22a2b2η2, (26)
f3 = (1 − d)2(ηd + 2(1− η)d2), (27)
f4 = (1 − d)22d2, (28)
f5 = (1 − d)2(2η2a2b2(1 + d) + 2η(1− η)d+ 2(1− η)2d2).
(29)
In the following, we give Q
(n,m)
i and e
(n,m)
i,bit .
For Type1, we have
Q
(1,1)
1 = p
2
1(µ)(2p
(1,1)
1,00 + p
(1,1)
1,01 + p
(1,1)
1,12 )/4, (30)
e
(1,1)
1,bit = p
2
1(µ)p
(1,1)
1,00 /(2Q
(1,1)
1 ), (31)
Q
(1,2)
1 = p1(µ)p2(µ)(2p
(1,2)
1,00 + p
(1,2)
1,01 + p
(1,2)
1,12 )/4, (32)
e
(1,2)
1,bit = p1(µ)p2(µ)p
(1,2)
1,00 /(2Q
(1,2)
1 ), (33)
Qtot1 = (2q1,00 + q1,01 + q1,12)/4, (34)
etot1 = q1,00/(2Q
tot
1 ). (35)
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Here the probabilities are expressed as
p
(1,1)
1,00 = T
2f2 + 2T (1− T )f3 + (1 − T )2f4, (36)
p
(1,1)
1,01 = T
2f1 + 2T (1− T )f3 + (1 − T )2f4, (37)
p
(1,1)
1,12 = T
2f5 + 2T (1− T )f3 + (1 − T )2f4, (38)
p
(1,2)
1,00 = (1− T )(T 2f2 + T (1− T )f3 + p(1,1)1,00 ), (39)
p
(1,2)
1,01 = (1− T )(T 2f1 + T (1− T )f3 + p(1,1)1,01 ), (40)
p
(1,2)
1,12 = (1− T )(T 2f5 + T (1− T )f3 + p(1,1)1,12 ), (41)
q1,00 = p
2
0(Tµ)f4 + 2p0(Tµ)p1(Tµ)f3 + p
2
1(Tµ)f2, (42)
q1,01 = p
2
0(Tµ)f4 + 2p0(Tµ)p1(Tµ)f3 + p
2
1(Tµ)f1, (43)
q1,12 = p
2
0(Tµ)f4 + 2p0(Tµ)p1(Tµ)f3 + p
2
1(Tµ)f5. (44)
For Type2, we have
Q
(1,1)
2 = p
2
1(µ)(p
(1,1)
2,00 + p
(1,1)
2,01 )/4, (45)
e
(1,1)
2,bit = p
2
1(µ)p
(1,1)
2,01 /(4Q
(1,1)
2 ), (46)
Q
(1,2)
2 = p1(µ)p2(µ)(p
(1,2)
2,00 + p
(1,2)
2,01 )/4, (47)
e
(1,2)
2,bit = p1(µ)p2(µ)p
(1,2)
2,01 /(4Q
(1,2)
2 ), (48)
Qtot2 = (q2,00 + q2,01)/4, (49)
etot2 = q2,01/(4Q
tot
2 ), (50)
where
p
(1,1)
2,00 = p
(1,1)
1,01 , (51)
p
(1,1)
2,01 = p
(1,1)
1,00 , (52)
p
(1,2)
2,00 = p
(1,2)
1,01 , (53)
p
(1,2)
2,01 = p
(1,2)
1,00 , (54)
q2,00 = q1,01, (55)
q2,01 = q1,00. (56)
Case (ii) Alice and Bob uses the heralded single photon sources.
From Ref. [1], the probability distribution function of the thermal state conditioned that the detector D0 clicked in
Fig. 2(b) is
Pn =
1
Pclick
µn(1− (1− η)n + d)
(1 + µ)n+1
, (57)
where Pclick is the probability that the detector D0 clicks, which is described by
Pclick =
(1 + d)(1 + µη)− 1
1 + µη
. (58)
By defining ηin = ηT , the probability that n photons exist before the BS conditioned on the click of D0 is
Qn =
1
Pclick
(
(1 + d)(µηin)
n
(1 + µηin)n+1
− (µηin(1− η))
n
(1 + µ(ηin + η − ηinη))n+1
)
. (59)
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For Type1, the relevant equations for Q
(n,m)
1 and e
(n,m)
1,bit are expressed by
Q
(1,1)
1 = P
2
1 (2p
(1,1)
1,00 + p
(1,1)
1,01 + p
(1,1)
1,12 )/4, (60)
e
(1,1)
1 = P
2
1 p
(1,1)
1,00 /(2Q
(1,1)
1 ), (61)
Q
(1,2)
1 = P1P2(2p
(1,2)
1,00 + p
(1,2)
1,01 + p
(1,2)
1,12 )/4, (62)
e
(1,2)
1 = P1P2p
(1,2)
1,00 /(2Q
(1,2)
1 ), (63)
Qtot1 = (2q1,00 + q1,01 + q1,12)/4, (64)
etot1 = q1,00/(2Q
tot
1 ), (65)
where
p
(1,1)
1,00 = η
2
ing4 + 2ηin(1− ηin)g2 + (1− ηin)2g1, (66)
p
(1,1)
1,01 = η
2
ing3 + 2ηin(1− ηin)g2 + (1− ηin)2g1, (67)
p
(1,1)
1,12 = η
2
ing8 + 2ηin(1− ηin)g2 + (1− ηin)2g1, (68)
p
(1,2)
1,00 = η
3
ing6 + 2η
2
in(1− ηin)g4 + η2in(1 − ηin)g7 + 3ηin(1 − ηin)2g2 + (1 − ηin)3g1, (69)
p
(1,2)
1,01 = η
3
ing5 + 2η
2
in(1− ηin)g3 + η2in(1 − ηin)g7 + 3ηin(1 − ηin)2g2 + (1 − ηin)3g1, (70)
p
(1,2)
1,12 = η
3
ing9 + 2η
2
in(1− ηin)g8 + η2in(1 − ηin)g7 + 3ηin(1 − ηin)2g2 + (1 − ηin)3g1, (71)
q1,00 = Q
2
0g1 + 2Q0Q1g2 +Q
2
1g4 + 2Q0Q2g7 + 2Q1Q2g6 +
∞∑
n,m=2
QnQm (72)
q1,01 = Q
2
0g1 + 2Q0Q1g2 +Q
2
1g3 + 2Q0Q2g7 + 2Q1Q2g5 (73)
q1,12 = Q
2
0g1 + 2Q0Q1g2 +Q
2
1g8 + 2Q0Q2g7 + 2Q1Q2g9. (74)
We note that in equation (72), we took the pessimistic scenario that all of the events for n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2 are detected
as the bit error. Here g1, . . . , g9 are given by
g1 = (1 − d)22d2, (75)
g2 = (1 − d)2d, (76)
g3 = (1 − d)2(2a2b2 + (a4 + b4)d), (77)
g4 = g3 − (1− d)22a2b2, (78)
g5 = (1 − d)2(9(a4b2 + a2b4) + 3(a6 + b6)d)/4, (79)
g6 = (1 − d)2((a4b2 + a2b4) + 3(a6 + b6)d)/4, (80)
g7 = g3/2, (81)
g8 = (1 − d)22a2b2(1 + d), (82)
g9 = (1 − d)2(a6 + b6 + 3(a4b2 + a2b4)d)/4. (83)
For Type2, we have
Q
(1,1)
2 = P
2
1 (p
(1,1)
2,00 + p
(1,1)
2,01 )/4, (84)
e
(1,1)
2 = P
2
1 p
(1,1)
2,01 /(4Q
(1,1)
2 ), (85)
Q
(1,2)
2 = P1P2(p
(1,2)
2,00 + p
(1,2)
2,01 )/4, (86)
e
(1,2)
2 = P1P2p
(1,2)
2,01 /(4Q
(1,2)
2 ), (87)
Qtot2 = (q2,00 + q2,01)/4, (88)
etot2 = q2,01/(4Q
tot
2 ), (89)
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where
p
(1,1)
2,00 = p
(1,1)
1,01 , (90)
p
(1,1)
2,01 = p
(1,1)
1,00 , (91)
p
(1,2)
2,00 = p
(1,2)
1,01 , (92)
p
(1,2)
2,01 = p
(1,2)
1,00 , (93)
q2,00 = q1,01, (94)
q2,01 = q1,00. (95)
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